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Effects of Political Dynamics Advanced by Sectarianism on Family Institutions in Tribal District Kurram of Pakistan

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Abstract: The study titled "Effects of Political Dynamics Advanced by Sectarianism on Family Institution in Tribal District Kurram of Pakistan" was carried out in the most sectarianism affected two Tehsils of Ali Zai and Parachinar under the quantitative study. A sample size of 200 respondents was randomly selected with an equal proportion of Shia-Sunni from the study universe, and a questionnaire was used as a tool for data collection. The data was analyzed at a uni-variate level with the help of frequency and percentage distributions through the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The association between dependent variables (Family Institution) and independent variables (Political Dynamics) was determined at a bi-variate level of analysis while using Chi-Square test statistics. The study concluded that people vote for their own sect, people never participate in the election campaign of another sect, selected members of legislative bodies mostly secure the objectives of their own sect and prefer their own sect with respect to developmental projects, political leaders influenced the authority of administrative officials, an administrative official appointed in the area most often of their own sect oriented, sect-based politics is part of the family discourse.

Key Words: Shia-Sunni, Sectarianism, Political Dynamics, Legislative Bodies, Administrative Officials, Expansion of Formal Courts, Devolution of Power, Maliks

Introduction

No specific Muslim conflict happened till the Iranian Revolution (1978-9) when Muslim religio-cultural independence received a political reputation. Subsequently, Muslims gained a key political movement not only in the Muslim world but also positively awakened European Muslims. This political awareness among the European Muslim community has created various political philosophies that helped in the formation of a 'Muslim Parliament' in England in 1990, sponsored by Iran (Karlsson, 1994). With the help of Shia, Tehrik Jafria won some seats in the Senate, the National Assembly and a Ministerial. Furthermore, Sipah e Muhammad was created by the Shia, who declared that it would not be a political party but a self-protective force and would be strengthened ahead, as announced by tens of thousands of Shia in Lahore, Pakistan. Later on, both SM, TJ and anti-Shiite organizations like SS and Lashkari Jungvi were banished by the armed ruler General Pervaiz Musharraf. The Shia are facing hard encounters in their residential areas of DI Khan, Tank, where Shia are targeted, and some families are migrating to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Tribal Districts near Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these encounters affected more Sunni than Shia, leading to the formation of groupings among locals, and senior clerics have no power over masses led by local leaders (Naqvi, 2007).

Saudi Arabia took advantage of religious changes and prejudiced outlooks that existed between the Sunni majority and Shia minority that stopped the developmental process of national politics, especially

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Pak-Iran, while both Saudi and Iran are in a cold war for religious and political impact in Pakistan, using sectarian and moral assistance as well as petrodollars strategies (Afzal, 2012). During the election and for the mobilization of the Sunnis by Sunni religio-political leaders, an anti-Ahmadiyya motivation and the Shia speech ‘Bab I Umar incident’ in which the Shia march polluted the name of the second *Khalifa*-Umar e Farooq who is the most respectable by the Sunnis have been against used in Jhang in the elections of 1970 (Kamran, 2008).

Ruling in FATA, like similar governments, the Taliban imposed taxes, collected defence money, demanded revenue in instalments and commissions from suppliers involved in native projects, and forced heavy fines for crimes such as robbery. They were also engaged in bank thefts outside their zones of “supremacy,” especially in Karachi. The state was unable to stop militants and their activities, which highlights the significance of political dynamics stressed on a basic element of any sort of restructuring inside Pakistan. These diversities existed between the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Taliban governance in FATA, which clarifies this point. These two areas have common language, ethnic and cultural identities, but the political mechanisms have been constructed totally oppositely. Political involvement mostly consisted of might and fear in FATA, whereas political involvement was totally normal in the other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In the 2002 provincial elections, MMA-the alliance of religious political parties-succeeded in all seats in the province with the support of the U.S.A. movement anti-Taliban and apparently with the indirect help of the Musharraf government because the latter desired to keep competing majority and ethnic political parties without power (Waseem, 2002). Only the existence of various sectarian identities, whether they are ethnic or religious, does not produce violence. The ratio of violent incidents was observed to be decreasing between 1995 and 2003, although around ten identities were engaged in the field. Whereas ethnic and religious groups are two different groups, fighting for territory and political authority seems to be a major factor in violence (Kaufman, 2013).

Ahmad (1998) and Waseem (2010) stated in the working paper that self-identity mostly gets violent because of spiritualism, which is misleadingly utilized to cover the materialistic aim and the view of the identity used for the violence. Irfani (2004) concluded that facts have shown that the prevailing strict laws of the state, along with the strong execution of local government, would be the inordinate sources of declining sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni. There is Talibanization in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where religious and extremist ideologies damage the minority and religious sects, while in India, the fascist forces are jointly suppressing the Muslims, Sikh and Christian minorities (Shah, 2002).

Methods and Procedure

The study titled “*Effects of Political Dynamics Advanced by Sectarianism on Family Institutions in Tribal District Kurram of Pakistan*” was carried out with the core objectives of ascertaining the association between internal political dynamics advanced by sectarianism and family institutions. The nature of the study was quantitative, and a questionnaire consisting of three points scale (Yes, No and Uncertain) was used as a tool for data collection. The study population were the two tehsils of tribal district Kurram, and 200 respondents were selected through a simple random sampling method from different areas of tehsil Ali zai and Parachinar with equal ratios, i.e., 100 from both Shia and Sunni. The collected data was analyzed and then presented at uni-variate and bi-variate levels. For drawing a discernible picture of the data, it was presented at a uni-variate level with frequency and percentages. The relationship between dependent (political dynamics) and independent (Family institution) variables were constructed with the help of Chi-Square test at the bi-variate level.

Table 1

Study results at uni-variate and bi-variate levels of analysis

Political Dynamics	Perceptions	Yes	No	Uncertain	Total	X and P Values
Is it true that most people vote for their own sect followers?	Yes	34	70	4	108(54%)	$\chi=23.34$ P=0.000
	No	31	50	0	81(40.5%)	
	Uncertain	1	7	3	11(5.5%)	



Political Dynamics	Perceptions	Yes	No	Uncertain	Total	X and P Values
Is it true that most people never participate in others' election campaigns?	Yes	32	55	0	87(43.5%)	$\chi = 50.27$ P=0.000
	No	34	57	1	92(46%)	
	Uncertain	0	15	6	21(10.5%)	
Is it true that selected members of legislative bodies mostly secured the objectives of their own sect?	Yes	57	70	1	128(64%)	$\chi = 40.01$ P=0.000
	No	7	45	2	54(27%)	
	Uncertain	2	12	4	18(9%)	
Do you think that selected members of legislative bodies prefer their own sect with respect to developmental projects?	Yes	48	55	0	103(51.5%)	$\chi = 36.55$ P=0.000
	No	18	63	4	85(42.5%)	
	Uncertain	0	9	3	12(6%)	
Do you think that political leaders influenced the authority of administrative officials to secure benefits for their sect?	Yes	52	101	1	154(77%)	$\chi = 37.09$ P=0.000
	No	10	6	0	16(8%)	
	Uncertain	4	20	6	30(15%)	
Do you think that administrative official appointed in the area are most often of their own sect-oriented?	Yes	56	66	1	123(61.5%)	$\chi = 50.40$ P=0.000
	No	9	47	1	57(28.5%)	
	Uncertain	1	14	5	20(10%)	
Is it true that sect-based politics is part of family discourse?	Yes	51	68	0	119(59.5%)	$\chi = 32.55$ P=0.000
	No	10	33	1	44(22%)	
	Uncertain	5	26	6	37(18.5%)	
Is it true that the merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can positively alter the situation with respect to sectarianism?	Yes	56	64	1	121(60.5%)	$\chi = 31.12$ P=0.000
	No	1	12	0	13(6.5%)	
	Uncertain	9	51	6	66(33%)	
Is it true that the expansion of formal courts can help reduce sectarian conflicts in the area?	Yes	56	75	0	131(65.5%)	$\chi = 37.07$ P=0.000
	No	4	19	0	23(11.5%)	
	Uncertain	6	33	7	46(23%)	
Do you think that devolution of power and authority through local government resolve the issue of sectarianism in the area?	Yes	45	63	1	109(54.5%)	$\chi = 23.69$ P=0.000
	No	12	11	3	26(13%)	
	Uncertain	9	53	3	65(32.5%)	
Do you think that some religio-political parties and leaders promote and encourage sectarianism in the area?	Yes	28	63	0	91(45.5%)	$\chi = 7.79$ P=0.099
	No	23	37	5	65(32.5%)	
	Uncertain	15	27	2	44(22%)	
Is it true that <i>Maliks</i> are most often sect-oriented?	Yes	49	47	0	96(48%)	$\chi = 66.27$ P=0.000
	No	9	63	0	72(36%)	
	Uncertain	8	17	7	32(16%)	
Is it true that National political forces can play a positive role in reducing sectarian conflicts in the area?	Yes	65	112	3	180(90%)	$\chi = 38.82$ P=0.000
	No	1	7	0	8(4%)	
	Uncertain	0	8	4	12(6%)	

Description of Study Results at Uni-Variate and Bi-Variate Levels

Study results in the above table show that the majority of the respondents, i.e. 108 (54.00%), agreed with the statement that most people vote for their own sect followers, and the above findings revealed that a highly significant association (P=0.000) were found between the family institution and the statement at bi-variate level of analysis. Most people never participate in the election campaign of another sect, as discarded by a majority of 92 (46.00%) of respondents, followed by a highly significant association

($P=0.000$) resulting between the family institution and the notion. Furthermore, the majority, 128 (64%) of the respondents, agreed that selected members of legislative bodies mostly secured the objectives of their own sect and a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) were found between family institutions and the notion. Study results in the above table show that the majority, 103 (51.5%) of the respondents agreed with the statement that selected members of legislative bodies prefer their own sect with respect to developmental projects, while a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) resulted between family institution and the statement at bi-variate level of analysis.

The findings of the research revealed that the majority, 154 (77%) of the respondents, agreed that political leaders influenced the authority of administrative officials to secure benefits for their sect at the uni-variate level and likewise, a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) resulted between the family institution and the notion at the bi-variate level of analysis. Furthermore, research findings revealed that the majority, 123 (61.5%) of the respondents, agreed that administrative officials appointed in the area most often of their own sect oriented and likewise, a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) resulted between family institutions and the notion. In addition to this, the majority, 119 (59.5%) of the respondents, agreed that sect-based politics is part of family discourse, while a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) were found between the family institution and the statement at the bi-variate level. Furthermore, research findings revealed that the majority, 121 (60.5%) of the respondents, agreed that the merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa can alter the situation positively with respect to sectarianism and a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) between family institutions and the notion.

In addition to this, the majority, 131 (65.5%) of the respondents, agreed that expansion of formal courts could help in the reduction of sectarian conflicts in the area at the uni-variate level and a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) revealed between the family institution and the statement at bi-variate level of analysis. Furthermore, research findings revealed that the majority, 109 (54.5%) of the respondents, agreed with the statement that devolution of power and authority through local government could resolve the issue of sectarianism in the area and, on another side, a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) resulted between the family institution and the statement. In addition to this, the majority, 91 (45.5%) of the respondents, agreed with the statement that some religio-political parties and leaders promote and encourage sectarianism in the area and in contrast to the above, a non-significant association ($P=0.099$) found between family institution and the statement at bi-variate level of analysis of the research. Furthermore, research findings revealed that the majority, 96 (48%) of the respondents, agreed with the statement that it is most often sect-oriented, and a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) resulted between the statement that is it true that *Maliks* are most often sect oriented and family institution. Lastly, the majority, 180 (90%) of the respondents, agreed that National political forces could play a positive role in reducing sectarian conflicts in the area and parallel to the above, a highly significant association ($P=0.000$) found between the family institution and notion at the bi-variate level of analysis.

Discussion

The study results regarding political dynamics associated with family institutions in the study universe and research findings revealed that the majority of the respondents agreed with the statement that most people vote for their own sect followers. It could be assumed that it's a fact that most people vote for their own sect followers where the people are in the majority, and there is a clear chance of winning their candidate, but some people also vote for other sect followers because they do not consider it a matter of religious activities and they gave importance to their needs, safety or affiliation to a political party. Voting for one's own sect could also be the reason that the ongoing sectarian clashes in the area created hatred between the two opposing family institutions. At the same time, in all human rights mechanisms adopted by the UN and the European Union, the right of all bona fide residents to poll and compete in public office is obviously well-known (Ahmed, 2005). The majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement that most people never participate in the election campaign of others. It could be assumed that some segment of the population participated in the election campaign of other sect followers either at the party level or focusing on the solution to their problems or considered politics distinct from their religious ideologies.



Selected members of legislative bodies mostly secured the objectives of their own sect. It could be assumed that due to active participation in meetings of MPA/MNA by political workers, they mostly addressed and achieved the materialistic agenda with respect to developmental projects on the guidance and consultation of their own sect followers and political workers, which mostly criticized and highlighted through media by the opposite political identities. Pakhtun *Jirga* totally enjoys the role of the judiciary, executive, and legislature. In case any revelry flops to obey the judgment of *Jirga*, called “*Makh Arawal*” in Pushto, meaning “turning of face”, then the *Jirga* assembly has the power to enforce its decision by any method (Takatoo, 2014). The political leaders influenced the power of administrative officials to address the confronted problems and save the lives, respect, property and holy places of worship of their sect on a priority basis in their area. An administrative official appointed in the area most often of their own sect oriented, but in most cases, the statement would be correct, and in few cases, the statement would be wrong when looked at and analyzed the appointment of administrative officials. However, they are custodians of citizens (both Shia-Sunni) lives, dignity, holy places and their properties in the area. People vote on sect bases where people are in the majority, while in villages and rural areas, people called meetings of their sect and planned their own objectives, giving importance to their interest but not to sect-based politics. People would be hopeful but not 100 % sure because it will be passed from some goal-oriented process and achievements regarding sectarian alleviation or alter the situation positively through the merger of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The expansion of family, civil and criminal courts could solve the root causes of disputes between Shia and Sunni families that supported and led to sectarian clashes in Kurram. The constructive efforts of local government bodies, along with local *Maliks* and religious clerics of both sects, could alter the situation very positively regarding sectarianism in the study universe. The devolution of power and authority through local government could resolve the issue of sectarianism in the area. Irfani (2004) concluded that facts show that the prevailing strict laws of the state, along with the strong execution of local government, would be the inordinate sources of declining sectarian clashes between Shia and Sunni. Some religio-political parties and their leaders promoted and encouraged sectarianism for their self-interest in the past in the area. Religious leaders raised their followers to defeat the other faction; the conflict was started at different levels, i.e. Shia-Sunni, native-migrant, and rural-urban, among other ethnic groups. Migrated people were being targeted by the Shi'a Jats and Rajputs. Pirs vanished the grip over rural inhabitants. Political orders changed, and new contestants have come to the sight. These were the religious leaders who aimed at religio-political leadership and fueled sectarian clashes (Khan & Chaudhry, 2011). *Maliks* would be race- or tribe-based and not sect-based, although there were many tribes to which both sects *Maliks* belonged in Kurram. Race and ethnicity are also a key element of a sectarian group's identity. Most scholars agree that ethnic identity is defined as “membership in an ethnic community” that provides one with an identity that is separate from other groups (Taras and Ganguly, 2002). National political forces can play a positive role in the reduction of sectarian conflicts in the study universe. National political forces most often have a secular outlook, having followers from both sects. So that there are greater possibilities while decreasing sectarianism if they involved true in spirits.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The study's conclusion of political dynamics associated with family institutions revealed that people prefer to vote for their own sect candidate and, in turn, also stand for the rights and objectives of their own sect followers. The selected members of legislative bodies prefer their own sect with respect to developmental projects. They also tried to influence administrative officials to attain their set goals. The study also concluded that the merger of FATA and expansion of formal courts may have a positive impact on the existing situation and sectarianism in a way that puts society in a harmonious way once it is part of their normative order. Likewise, it is believed that if nationalist political forces are given an opportunity, they can contribute positively to decreasing the ongoing sectarian militancy in the area. All the disputed lands are withdrawn till the final judgment by state authorities with the court of laws. The merger of FATA into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, government institutions and departments should be fast and functional to address sectarian causes and roots used for sectarianism like smuggling, drugs, NCP vehicles, households weapons, militant organizations, etc., as well as ensure the development of the physical infrastructure, upgrade the backward health facilities, communication system, educational institution etc. in Kurram. Pak-Iran-Saudi

peace joint ventures should be implemented by the politicians regarding sectarian alleviation and the impact of their proxy war on Pakistani society, especially in the tribal District Kurram, Pakistan, were some policy recommendations.

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